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e) Unadjudicated acts of misconduct:
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that unadjudicated acts of
prior criminal conduct could be used to prove the "future dangerous-
ness" prong in the penalty phase of a capital trial. O'Dell v. Common-
wealth, 234 Va. 672, 699-700, 363 S.E.2d 491, 506-507 (1988). On
appeal, however, Watkins claimed that the use of prior unadjudicated
criminal conduct to prove "future dangerousness" is unconstitutional
unless the court specifies the standard of proof governing the
establishment of such conduct. Because Watkins failed to preserve
this issue at trial, the court would not consider it on appeal.
ANALYSIS
a) Challenges to the array:
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in addressing Watkins'
challenge to the jury array, correctly stated the principle that a
defendant must make a showing that a distinctive group has been
consistently under-represented on juries in the community over a
period of time in order to sustain a Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection violation. However, the court made no mention of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury based
on a fair cross section of the community. Although the court was
correct in its assertion that a defendant has no right to have a petit
jury mirror the community, the defendant is entitled to a fair
opportunity to have such a jury by being afforded an array from
which no "cognizable" group has been excluded. Under-representa-
tion is primafacie evidence of systematic exclusion. Under-
representation over a period of time is not a necessary component of
this Sixth Amendment claim. Watkins made a showing that there was
an under-representation of blacks on the jury array, and alleged that
this under-representation was due to a systematic exclusion brought
about by the jury commissioner's reliance on voter registration lists
to form the jury array. This evidence constituted prima facie proof
that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred. At this point, the
prosecution was under a duty to rebut this claim by proving that a
significant governmental interest justified the imbalance. The court,
rather than the prosecution provided a rebuttal to the claim.
b) Sentence based on racial prejudice:
In McCleskey v. Kemp, supra, the court recognized that there
could be a constitutionally unacceptable risk of racial bias in
sentencing. It found however, that even assuming validity of a
statewide study indicating that blacks who killed whites were
significantly more likely to be sentenced to death, McCleskey had not
presented evidence of the possibility of racism in his trial.
Watkins undertook to demonstrate that risk in his trial by proffer
of the recent actions of Danville juries in capital cases. The Supreme
Court of Virginia found his showing insufficient. The court invites,
however, defense counsel to make more detailed showings. Counsel
should, in a proper case, request the time and resources necessary to
make the showing suggested by the Court. A proper case might be
one, like Watkins, with a black defendant and a white victim, which
arises in a venue with a history of racial discrimination.
c) Corroboration of confession:
The correctness of determination of this issue depends on the
interpretation of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct 1068,25 L.
Ed. 2d 368 (1970), in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the prosecution has the burden of proving each and every
element of the crime with which the defendant is charged. In this
case, the court's holding, that it is a question of law for the court to
decide whether a confession has been sufficiently corroborated by the
prosecution, takes away from the jury the responsibility to find every
element of the offense.
d) Parole eligibility:
Evidence of defendant's parole eligibility is clearly relevant to
the mitigation of his penalty. Not only could this information weaken
the evidence of his future dangerousness to the community, but it is
also non-statutory mitigation evidence itself. This type of claim may
eventually win the approval of the courts, and should continue to be
asserted through proposed jury instructions.
e) Unadjudicated acts of misconduct:
Finally, it is once again necessary to remind all attorneys of the
importance of preserving for appeal their objections to the rulings of
the trial court, and thereafter to raise those issues on appeal. The
constitutionality of using future dangerousness as an aggravating
factor has been specifically upheld by the United States Supreme
Court. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3391,
77 L. Ed. 2d 1090, 1097 (1983). Unanswered questions remain,
however, about the procedures for establishing that factor in a given
case. Those claims not properly preserved at trial or raised on appeal
may have been the ones which would have turned a death sentence
into a term of life imprisonment.
Summary and analysis by: Catherine M. Hobart
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Douglas McArthur Buchanan was convicted of capital murder
under Va. Code Ann. §18.2-31(7) for the murder of his father in the
same transaction in which he murdered his two half-brothers and his
step-mother. The Commonwealth had charged Buchanan with 5
different combinations of these murders in three different indict-
ments. Buchanan also was convicted of first degree murder for all
four murders, Va. Code Ann. §18.2-32, and of use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony for each murder under Va. Code Ann. §18.2-
53.1. Buchanan was sentenced to death for the capital murder
conviction, four terms of life imprisonment for the first degree
murder convictions and a total of 14 years for the firearms convic-
tions.
All the murders took place within a two-hour time frame in the
family's home. Buchanan killed his father first by shooting him with
a .22-calibre rifle. Fifteen minutes later, his brothers arrived.
Buchanan shot the first brother as the boy came in the door. He shot
the second brother in the yard, but the boy did not die. Buchanan
helped the brother to the house, but then stabbed him once inside.
Buchanan waited inside the house for his step-mother and killed her
with the knife once she arrived.
Buchanan raised several issues on appeal. First, Buchanan
complained that the capital murder indictments failed to inform him
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of the charges against him. Specifically, he claimed that the prosecu-
tion obtained multiple alternative indictments alleging that various
murders were part of the same act or transaction and, therefore,
Buchanan never knew which of the murders the prosecution was
alleging happened in the "same act or transaction." Buchanan also
asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel
to describe the specifics of all the indictments against him. Second,
Buchanan alleged error in several aspects of jury selection. In
particular, Buchanan alleged that the trial court erred in (1) denying
Buchanan's request for individual sequestered voir dire, (2) disallow-
ing two specific questions Buchanan's attorneys sought to ask jurors
during voir dire, (3) showing partiality toward the commonwealth




The Supreme Court held that "the Commonwealth is free to
indict an individual for as many separate crimes as the Common-
wealth, in good faith, thinks it can prove. Further, the Commonwealth
is free to charge the commission of a single offense in several
different ways in order to meet the contingencies of proof."
Buchanan, Va. at , _ S.E. at . Accordingly, the
Commonwealth was free to shuffle the murders around in several
different indictments depending upon which murders could be shown
to be part of the "same act or transaction." The key, according to the
Supreme Court, is how many "transactions" occurred. "Here, four
people were killed; thus, there was the theoretical possibility that
Buchanan could be convicted of two capital murders....If all four
were killed in one act or transaction, Buchanan could only be
convicted of one capital murder." Buchanan, - Va. at__
S.E.2d at - (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court also held that the trial court had discretion
to order counsel not to mention the specific indictments in opening
statements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision on this point as well.
II. Jury Selection Issues
A. Individual Sequestered Voir Dire - The Supreme Court stated
that, because a criminal defendant has no right to individual voir dire,
it follows that there is no right to individual sequestered voir dire.
Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court did not err in refusing
Buchanan's request.
B. Restrictions of Questions Asked by Defense Counsel -
Buchanan's counsel sought to ask prospective jurors the following
questions:
(1) From what you have read or heard about this case in
the newspapers, what impression do you have about
this case?
(2) Do you believe that a death sentence is the only
appropriate punishment for capital murder?
The Supreme Court held that "to be relevant, a question to a
prospective juror must necessarily disclose or clearly lead to the
disclosure of opinion or prejudice." Buchanan, __ Va. at ___
S.E.2d at . The Court held that the first question was vague and
unfocused and, therefore, did not meet the above standard. The Court
held that the second question was properly rejected because it was
virtually identical to a question rejected in a previous opinion,
Patterson v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 283 S.E. 2d 212 (1981).
The court held that the question was "vague, argumentative, and non-
C. Partiality Toward Commonwealth During Voir Dire -The
Supreme Court summarily rejected Buchanan's claim of partiality,
stating that "The trial court conducted proper voir dire, which has
been subject to unfounded attack by Buchanan in this appeal. We
hold that the trial court did not display bias or partiality towards the
Commonwealth." Id., __Va. at _ S.E.2d at__
D. Motion for Additional Peremptory Strikes -The Supreme
Court held that no basis exists in Virginia law for granting the
defendant additional peremptory challenges. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly rejected the
defendant's request for such challenges.
ANALYSIS
I. The Indictments
The Supreme Court of Virginia cleared up one unanswered
question in this case by defining the number of capital murder
convictions that can be derived from one transaction under Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-31(7). Regardless of the number of victims, if a multiple
murder can be defined as one transaction, the defendant can be
convicted of only one count of capital murder. Accordingly, if there
is no question about the number of transactions, then the number of
capital murder convictions possible is also fixed.
If, however, there is a good faith dispute about the number of
transactions involved, the prosecution can allege as many different
combinations of murders that it can in good faith thinks it can prove.
Accordingly, the Commonwealth is not required to make an election
as to the transaction or transactions it intends to prove.
II. Jury Selection Issues
The Supreme Court of Virginia historically has afforded a great
deal of deference to the discretion of the trial court. The Court's
holdings on Buchanan's jury issues reflect that deference. For
example, the Supreme Court of Virginia has only granted relief based
on voir dire restrictions once. In Patterson v. Commonwealth, supra,
the trial judge asked questions of the venire which would disqualify
persons who opposed the death penalty, but refused defense counsel's
request that two questions be asked which would reveal persons
whose support of the death penalty might disqualify them. The
Supreme Court of Virginia found reversible error in the trial judge's
refusal to ask:
"If you sat as a juror in this case, and if the jury should
happen to convict the Defendant of capital murder, would
you be able to consider voting for a sentence less that
death?" Id. at 657.
The Court, however, held that another question complained of was
"vague, argumentative and non-specific." Id. at 657, 659. That
question resembles the question which the trial court in Buchanan
refused to permit:
"Do you believe that the death penalty is ordinarily the
proper punishment for the crime of capital murder?" Id.
Defense counsel should continue to proffer this question or the
form used in Buchanan. Even though the Supreme Court of Virginia
has held that the trial court has discretion to disallow the question, a
trial judge may decide to allow it. Furthermore, neither question is
"vague, argumentative and non-specific," even under the Court's own
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juror to answer the questions "yes," the juror might be disqualified.
The life/death qualification of a juror to sit in a capital case is a
federal constitutional question.
Counsel for capital defendants also should continue to ask
questions similar to Buchanan's first question regarding pretrial
publicity. Trial courts routinely ask jurors if they can set aside any
impressions or opinions received of the case formed before trial. This
question, however, leaves out a logical step: determining whether the
juror has any specific impressions to set aside and what they are. The
right to a fair and impartial jury is also a federal constitutional
question.
Defense counsel also should continue to request individual
sequestered voir dire, additional peremptory challenges, and
meaningful, non-leading voir dire. Many trial judges will and have
exercised their discretion to grant these requests. Counsel should
continue to tie these requests to the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution's guarantee of the right to a fair and impartial jury
and to Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976), as did
Buchanan. Woodson held that due process requires a greater degree
of reliability in a process that can determine death as an appropriate
punishment. This has been termed "super due process." The United
States Supreme Court has acknowledged this principle recently by
suggesting that special capital procedures are available only at trial
and on direct appeal. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 106 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (1989) (see discussion of Giarratano, this issue). Since the
trial jury is the life/death decision maker, more Sixth Amendment
procedures are arguably required to ensure reliability.
Individually, none of the objections based on jury selection
procedures is particularly strong in the constitutional sense. The
combined effect of all the things Buchanan complained about,
however, could amount to a denial of due process. For instance, if the
trial court denies defense counsel's motions for individual seques-
tered voir dire, meaningful, non-leading voir dire, additional
peremptory challenges, change of venue, and others, the combined
effect might well be that the defendant is not tried by a lawfully
constituted, impartial jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Accordingly, defense counsel should object to the jury selection
process as a whole, and tie this larger objection to federal law as
described above. While individual jury selection problems may not
result in an eventual reversal, a combined objection may.
It should also be remembered that objections to the qualifica-
tions of prospective jurors or limitations on examination of a
particular prospective juror must be restated at the time the juror is
about to be seated. Valid objections which counsel made during voir
dire are lost if not renewed when the jury is seated. In addition,
counsel should note which jurors counsel would challenge if
additional peremptory challenges were granted. Only in this way will
questionable jury selection procedures be preserved for appeal.
Summary and analysis by: Diane U. Montgomery
HOKE v. COMMONWEALTH
237 Va. 303,377 S.E.2d 595 (1989)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Ronald Lee Hoke, Sr., was convicted of capital murder in the
commission of rape, robbery, and abduction. On October 7, 1985 the
police found Virginia C. Stell's body in her apartment. Stell had been
stabbed twice. A medical examiner expressed belief that Stell "had
some period of time of survival, at least several minutes." Her arms
bore severe bruises. Stell was tightly bound with electrical cords.
Evidence indicated Stell had been penetrated vaginally and anally.
Semen matching Hoke's blood type was found on sheets and a
bedspread in Stell's bedroom.
On October 15, 1985, Hoke surrendered to police in Hager-
stown, Maryland confessing to Stell's murder. He stated that they had
engaged in consensual sex. They then argued. Stell's murder ensued.
Hoke stated that Stell had taken unfair advantage of him in a drug
deal, so he ransacked her apartment looking to recoup his loss. He
also stated that he had previously pondered killing someone, not
attributable to any provocation.
In addition to having been murdered, the jury found that Stell
had been raped, robbed, and abducted. The jury found that each of
these offenses occurred as an interdependent part of a common
criminal design (murder and rape, murder and robbery, and murder
and abduction). Each of these offenses gave rise to separate capital
imurder counts against the defendant. See, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-
31(l)(4)(5) (1988).
The defendant's appeal raised three issues concerning which no
objection was raised at trial: that the court clerk struck the wrong
venireman pursuant to the defense's fourth peremptory strike, that the
trial court failed to rule on a defense motion for change of venue, and
that Virginia's standard verdict form is constitutionally deficient.
HOLDING
On automatic appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the
findings of fact regarding the three capital murder counts were
supported by the evidence. The rape charge was supported by the
bruised and bound condition of the corpse in addition to the evidence
of sexual activity. The robbery charge was supported by the ransack-
ing of Stell's apartment at or about the time of the murder. The
abduction was supported by Stell's period of survival after the
stabbing and the excessive force involved in binding Stell's body.
The court found that more force was involved in binding S tell than
was necessary to affect a rape.
The court also held that Hoke waived his appeal to the mistakes
in voir dire and change of venue because defense counsel failed to
object to the former and failed to renew its motion for the latter. Also
defense counsel presented no evidence in support of its motion for
change of venue, making harmless any error in failing to rule on the
motion.
Despite defense counsel's failure to object at trial, the court
ruled that the use of Virginia's standard verdict form did not violate
Hoke's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. The jury's verdict
incorporated the statutory language of the verdict form. The trial
judge polled the jury. The opinion is silent concerning the scope of
the questions used in polling the jury. Polling could entail at least
three different levels of inquiry. The polling could have inquired
whether each individual juryperson found that the defendant deserved
the death penalty. Polling questions could have asked whether the
juryperson agreed with the verdict as worded in the verdict form.
More precise polling could have inquired into which aggravating
predicate the juryperson found. Nevertheless, the Virginia Supreme
